|author||Rich Felker <email@example.com>||2022-06-03 18:54:41 -0400|
|committer||Rich Felker <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2022-06-03 18:54:41 -0400|
remove random filename obfuscation that leaks ASLR information
the __randname function is used by various temp file creation interfaces as a backend to produce a name to attempt using. it does not have to produce results that are safe against guessing, and only aims to avoid unintentional collisions. mixing the address of an object on the stack in a reversible manner leaked ASLR information, potentially allowing an attacker who can observe the temp files created and their creation timestamps to narrow down the possible ASLR state of the process that created them. there is no actual value in mixing these addresses in; it was just obfuscation. so don't do it. instead, mix the tid, just to avoid collisions if multiple processes/threads stampede to create temp files at the same moment. even without this measure, they should not collide unless the clock source is very low resolution, but it's a cheap improvement. if/when we have a guaranteed-available userspace csprng, it could be used here instead. even though there is no need for cryptographic entropy here, it would avoid having to reason about clock resolution and such to determine whether the behavior is nice.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/fenv/armhf')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions