|author||Rich Felker <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2012-09-15 03:03:21 -0400|
|committer||Rich Felker <email@example.com>||2012-09-15 03:03:21 -0400|
revert low rounds-count limits in crypt hashes
it was determined in discussion that these kind of limits are not sufficient to protect single-threaded servers against denial of service attacks from maliciously large round counts. the time scales simply vary too much; many users will want login passwords with rounds counts on a scale that gives decisecond latency, while highly loaded webservers will need millisecond latency or shorter. still some limit is left in place; the idea is not to protect against attacks, but to avoid the runtime of a single call to crypt being, for all practical purposes, infinite, so that configuration errors can be caught and fixed without bringing down whole systems. these limits are very high, on the order of minute-long runtimes for modest systems.
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/syscall_arch.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions